{"id":115015,"date":"2026-06-02T02:50:00","date_gmt":"2026-06-02T00:50:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sonnenseite.com\/?p=115015"},"modified":"2026-06-02T09:03:09","modified_gmt":"2026-06-02T07:03:09","slug":"how-the-eus-carbon-price-on-imports-strengthens-climate-policies-globally","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.sonnenseite.com\/en\/economy\/how-the-eus-carbon-price-on-imports-strengthens-climate-policies-globally\/","title":{"rendered":"How the EU\u2019s carbon price on imports strengthens climate policies globally"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
In early 2026, the EU extended its domestic carbon pricing to key products from beyond its borders. This is managed through the \u201cCarbon Border Adjustment Mechanism\u201d (CBAM). Exporters of polluting goods to the EU must pay a climate tariff, unless their country has its own pricing scheme. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
A study finds that this could incentivise EU trade partners to adopt carbon pricing as well. In particular Canada, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are found to be likely candidates, leading to 73 percent more CO\u2082 emissions being avoided compared to when only the EU applies its climate policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The peer-reviewed study is already available on the website of the Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (JAERE)<\/em>, and will appear in its November 2026 print edition. It was led by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThe Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism is intended to enable the EU industry to decarbonise while remaining competitive \u2013 but what happens outside of the EU is not less significant,\u201d explains PIK researcher Timoth\u00e9 Beaufils, the study\u2019s lead author. \u201cWe already observe other countries like Brazil or Turkey responding to the CBAM with their own carbon price. We developed a novel framework to estimate this policy diffusion effect. It provides a strong indication that the EU Green Deal has indeed the potential to trigger the reinforcement of climate policies in other countries.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The study is based on a specially developed economic model that combines two strands of research: trade economics and game theory. Based on their economic interest, trading partners choose between paying the climate tariff into the EU coffers \u2013 or implementing their own carbon price and thus joining what the study calls a \u201cclimate coalition\u201d. Detailed trade simulations are used to inform these decisions, which depend on the carbon price level, the exact design of the CBAM \u2013 and the countries already part of the coalition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The CBAM carbon pricing on imports currently applies to steel, iron, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen. To assess its incentive effect on international climate cooperation, the research team feeds its calculation tool with empirical data on trade flows for 56 economic sectors and 43 countries. Using these figures, the team models the EU\u2019s climate policy based on a carbon price of 100 dollars per tonne. The model analysis shows some striking ripple effects: <\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Without border adjustment,<\/strong> the European carbon price results in a reduction in domestic European emissions of 505 million tonnes of CO\u2082 per year. Outside the EU, however, emissions increase such that global emissions are only 305 million tonnes lower. This is because other countries move to supply the more energy-intensive products and, moreover, benefit from lower world market prices due to Europe\u2019s phase-out of fossil fuels. EU climate protection therefore has a massive leak \u2013 known as \u201ccarbon leakage\u201d \u2013 offsetting 40 percent of Europe\u2019s emission reduction.\u00a0<\/li>\n\n\n\n
With the border adjustment, <\/strong>the carbon leakage effect is much smaller, only 15 percent instead of 40 percent before, resulting in as much as 399 million tonnes of CO\u2082 emissions reduced globally.\u00a0<\/li>\n\n\n\n
With a policy response from trading partners<\/strong>, the global reduction in emissions is 691 million tonnes, a further 73 percent over and above the impact of the EU climate policy alone. Four countries \u2013 Canada, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan \u2013 avoid the additional burden of CBAM by implementing their own carbon pricing, thereby joining the climate coalition.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
Additional model runs show that extensions of the CBAM to other sectors could make it beneficial for more countries to join the climate coalition, including the US. By contrast, China would currently only participate if the carbon price were below 20 dollars per tonne. While the exact quantitative findings of the study depend on specific model assumptions, the main finding that the EU CBAM triggers the adoption of carbon pricing holds under a broad range of modelling assumptions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cOur findings support and quantify the hypothesis that the EU CBAM can trigger a so-called Brussels effect,\u201d summarises Leonie Wenz, PIK researcher and a co-author of the study. \u201cWhat this means is that, due to the EU\u2019s central position in international supply chains, policies adopted in Brussels spill over to outside the EU. Greater climate action leads to even greater climate action. This can play an important role in climate mitigation, especially if international negotiations on climate mitigation stall.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Beaufils, T., Wanner, J., Wenz, L., (im Druck): The Potential of carbon border adjustments to foster climate cooperation.\u00a0Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (JAERE).<\/em>\u00a0Erscheint im November 2026. [DOI: 10.1086\/742163<\/a>]<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n