China’s International Climate-Related Finance Provision and Mobilization for South-South Cooperation
This paper discusses the climate finance mobilized by China to support developing countries’ climate actions. It examines China’s climate finance through various channels: bilateral public finance, multilateral public finance, export credits, and mobilized private finance, to estimate how much finance was provided and mobilized from 2013 to 2022.
The climate crisis is escalating at an alarming rate, with devastating consequences worldwide. This urgency demands immediate, transformative action supported by robust climate finance. Developing countries in the Global South are the most vulnerable to climate impacts, despite having contributed least to the problem and possessing fewer resources to adapt. These nations could seize the opportunity to achieve net zero development pathways but require international support to do so.
In 2009, at the 15th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), developed country parties committed to a goal of jointly mobilizing $100 billion a year by 2020 (ultimately extended to 2025) for climate action. China is not a developed country party and therefore is not obligated to deliver on that goal. However, under articles 9.2, 9.5, 9.7, and 13.9 of the 2015 Paris Agreement, China and other developing country parties in a position to do so are invited to provide financial support on a voluntary basis and communicate information about support provided and mobilized.
Over the past decades, China has extended financial support to other developing countries through South-South cooperation. Recognizing the scale of China’s financial support could help to sustain or raise its international climate finance efforts, both within China and in support of other countries, as well as build trust that could lead to a more ambitious global climate finance goal.
Researchers have attempted to quantify the scale of China’s international climate finance support, but the data provided by the Chinese government on its international development, including climate-related supports, is often aggregate and sporadic. To date, a comprehensive overview and examination of China’s progress and scaling in providing international climate finance has been lacking. This paper aims to address this research gap.
Properly evaluating the scale of China’s climate-related finance requires a clear assessment of the various financing mechanisms through which China’s capital flows. Government agencies, development finance institutions, and implementation agencies play diverse roles in deciding, managing, reporting, and disclosing climate-related finance. This understanding is crucial in the context of calls for greater collaboration with and support from China for other developing countries’ transitions.
This paper aims to provide a more comprehensive and comparable picture of the climate-related finance China has provided and mobilized by collecting and collating China’s climate finance from four components: bilateral public finance, multilateral public finance, export credits, and mobilized private finance. The paper found that from 2013-2022, China voluntarily provided and mobilized $45 billion to support efforts to curb emissions or adapt to climate impacts in developing countries (or $4.5 billion a year, on average), amounting to roughly 6% of the total climate finance from developed countries during the same 10-year period.
This research also maps how various Chinese stakeholders currently report and disclose information on international climate and development finance. Such a mapping has the potential to benefit China’s domestic agenda on consolidating its development aid model and help facilitate the global initiative to sustain international financing for net zero emissions and resilient and inclusive growth in developing countries.